United States - Mexico Law Journal
Volume 10 Presentations at the Tenth Annual
Conference
3-1-2002

Panel Discussion on Recent Amendments of
Mexican Banking and Securities Law
John E. Rogers
Luis Capin Lopez
Francisco Carrillo Gamboa
Eduardo Martinez Rodriguez
Lee Polson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/usmexlj
Part of the International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the
Jurisprudence Commons
Recommended Citation
John E. Rogers, Luis C. Lopez, Francisco C. Gamboa, Eduardo Martinez Rodriguez & Lee Polson, Panel Discussion on Recent
Amendments of Mexican Banking and Securities Law, 10 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 147 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/usmexlj/vol10/iss1/25

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals
at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in United
States - Mexico Law Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

Article 25

PANEL DISCUSSION ON RECENT AMENDMENTS OF MEXICAN
BANKING AND SECURITIES LAW
MODERATOR: JOHN E. ROGERS, ESQ.'
Panelists: Lic. Luis Capfn Lopez; Lie. Francisco Carrillo Gamboa;
Lie. Eduardo Martinez Rodriguez; Lee Poison, Esq.
JOHN E. ROGERS: Eduardo Martinez noted that an arbitration clause can be
included in a shareholders agreement and can also be included in the bylaws, or
estatutos. However, the role of the shareholders agreement is different: some
provisions that are useful to have in the shareholders agreement may not be suitable
to put in the bylaws because of their public nature. The bylaws must be registered
and are open for inspection by the public to a great extent. It seems to me that there
is a real risk of inconsistency. For example, one arbitration proceeding could be
initiated pursuant to the shareholders agreement, and another could be initiated
pursuant to the bylaws, with inconsistent results. Do you think that is a real risk?
EDUARDO MARTINEZ: Certainly it is a risk. We have seen it vis-A-vis
arbitrations, Mr. Rogers. We have seen it vis-A-vis Mexican courts and arbiter
tribunals. In only one case that I know of-and if somebody knows of other cases,
it would be good for them to comment-Mexican courts ruled that the arbitration
should go forward. This was a very technical case, with a dispute as to financial
statements and disclosure of financial information among the shareholders. One
shareholder opposed the arbitration and went directly to court. Finally, in about
three months (which is amazingly fast), in the first instance the court said no, you
have to go to arbitration. The party did not follow up and we finished in arbitration
on that regard. But certainly, if you do not draft your documents very clearly and
are not extremely knowledgeable of what you are doing within the shareholders
agreement and bylaws, you will have these conflicts.
ROGERS: One way of approaching this is to include in your shareholders
agreement an arbitration clause or a provision to the effect that in the event of any
conflict between the shareholders agreement and the bylaws, that the bylaws would
control?
MARTINEZ: I've seen it both ways. The bylaws can control or the
shareholders agreement can control.
ROGERS: But would that be valid?
MARTINEZ: Yes, that would be valid. Again, in the corporate rights, in the
economic rights, and in the information rights, if you have the same wording in your
shareholders agreement that is in the bylaws, it would certainly work.
ROGERS: Lie. Capfn, do you see any problems with putting an arbitration
clause in the bylaws? Are there provisions that you feel would not be subject to the
shareholders?
LUIS CAPIN: Lic. Martinez made the comment that there are some provisions
that may or may not be enforceable due to public order. Also, they may or may not
be enforceable because of the timing provided by Mexican law in order to be able
to react, which would not be possible to do through arbitration. My suggestion in
this case is that if you were going to put an arbitration clause in your bylaws, you

* A summary of the background of each of the participants in this panel follows on the last page of the
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would have to include the exception for specific cases. That is an arbitration law in
which the parties would be able to go to court in order not to have a party playing
both ways saying yes, I want arbitration, or, no, I don't want arbitration. Another
thing that I consider important is that through the formation of the corporation there
is a contract. Both Lic. Martinez and I tried to stress that. There is a contract
between both parties. But as soon as the corporation is formed, it is considered a
legal entity independent of the shareholders. At that time it is created as an
institution, and the bylaws control two types of relationships: the conduct of this
entity vis-A-vis the shareholders and the relationships among the shareholders.
There are clauses that relate to one or the other. The fact that these shareholders
dispute with respect to their rights vis-A-vis the corporation, or their rights among
themselves, that will be, for example, the right of first refusal and all the creative
clauses that we have invented for the sale of shares of the corporation. The
corporation doesn't have to do anything about that. The corporation is just an entity.
This is a dispute between shareholders. That is handled through the shareholders
agreement or is included in the bylaws because it is a contract among shareholders.
That's something that could go to the arbitration, and it shouldn't be a problem. But
the fact of adopting a resolution by shareholders' meeting or by a board of directors
against the bylaws of the corporation, which affects third parties or which averts one
of the shareholders, should be really examined more closely. Who is the entity and
who is the board and the original body that will be able to protect that? Arbitration?
I would say courts.
MARTINEZ: In that regard, certainly many arbitration rules of the various
institutions like the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)1 and the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) 2, et cetera, will allow parties to establish arbitration
clauses and make any exceptions that the parties want in order to go to the national
courts, as Lic. Capfn was saying. It is important to do that in the drafting, if you
want to do that.

ROGERS: Another question that I would like to throw out to everyone is:
When we get to publicly traded companies, clearly there is a major difference
between the securities markets in Mexico and the securities markets in U.S. The
difference exists not only in terms of size, number of issuers, breadth of share
ownership, but also the fundamental fact that in Mexico most publicly traded
companies are not true public companies in the sense that they are in the U.S. In
most cases there is a controlling group, and the publicly traded shares are really held
by a minority. I think Mr. Polson touched on one of the issues that will be played
out differently in Mexico than in the U.S.: that the dynamics for exercising
shareholders rights are different. Basically in the U.S. you exercise them by buying
or selling, whereas in Mexico that's not as much of an option. I wonder if these
recent changes in Mexican law and regulation will bring Mexico closer to the U.S.
model or will it require something more?

1. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), founded in 1919, is the world business organization.
It promotes an open international trade and investment system and the market economy. It also provides as a service

the International Court of Arbitration.
2. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is the United States' largest full-service alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) provider, assisting in the design and implementation of ADR systems for corporations, unions,
government agencies and the courts.
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FRANCISCO CARRILLO GAMBOA: In my opinion the shareholders' rights
still exist under a principle of having to prove that you are an equity holder in
Mexico and complying with the provisions set forth in Mexican law in order to be
able to participate in shareholders' meetings. Nevertheless, one thing that is part
3
and parcel of the United States are the proxies. Now, the Mexican Securities Act
requires that all the issuers have proxy documentation available so that the
shareholders are represented in the shareholders' meeting and are able to specify
how they want to vote their shares at the meeting. In comparison with the United
States, it is a question of culture in Mexico because we have to be able to advise our
investors in Mexico that at present the right to vote on a certain matter is a right that
has been conferred to them and not to the institutions that normally represent
shareholders in publicly traded companies. Mexican practice for many years has
been that the intermediaries attend the shareholders' meeting and exercise their
voting rights, because there are three holders. They are the holders of the equity.
Now with the change, Mexican investors or foreign investors will be able to actually
inform the custodian how to vote on the shares, provided that they comply with the
voting procedures. An important issue is how to vote on the shares. The voting
instruction will be from the holder to the custodian so that the custodian can go to
the meeting and exercise the rights.
ROGERS: It is a little more complicated when we talk about foreign owners of
American Depository Receipts (ADR)4. How does the procedure differ?
CARRILLO: That is more complicated if you are a holder of an ADR. Number
one: we have to know what is the underlying equity and whether that gives you full
voting rights, limited voting rights, or no voting rights in Mexico. The ADR is an
instrument that is issued in the United States, but in Mexico the ADR as an
underlying instrument has an equity security. Assuming that you have full voting
rights, because the ADR represents common stock in Mexico, consider the
following. The ADR holder would have to request that the custodian in the United
States give them the necessary evidence that they are a holder of the ADR. Also,
there will have to be an instruction by which the ADR holder would go to the
custodian-not to the U.S. bank but to the custodian in Mexico on behalf of the U.S.
bank-and justify the U.S. bank's voting right. Then the Mexican custodian would
attend the shareholders' meeting following the instructions of the ADR holder, or
following the instructions as an attorney-in-fact of the foreign issuer of the ADR
holder. In practice, they do not attend shareholders' meetings because normally the
Mexican custodian would represent the shares based on the fact that since the
Mexican custodian did not receive an instruction that the ultimate holder wanted to
attend, the Mexican custodian would attend the meetings and exercise voting rights.
First, you have to justify that you have an interest in the shares, then you have

3. The Mexican Securities Act is also known as the Ley de la Comisi6n Nacional Bancariay de Valores
(Law of the National Banking and Securities Commission). The text is available at: http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/
leyinfo/46/.

4. An ADR is an instrument traded on a U.S. securities exchange or over the counter that is issued by a U.S.
bank and represents a specified number of shared in a foreign corporation. ADRs are bought and sold in the
American markets just like regular shares. An ADR is issued by a U.S. bank and consists of a bundle of shares of
a foreign corporation that are being held in custody overseas.
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justify to the Mexican custodian that you have the beneficial interest and you have
the right to vote the shares.
LEE POLSON: I have a couple of comments and then a question. First of all,
a major difference in the United States is that typically the brokers' and dealers'
institutions that hold securities in street name for beneficial owners do not vote those
shares absent a specific instruction from the account holder. Instead, the proxy rules
require that an institutional holder, such as a depository trust company or an
individual broker-dealer, make arrangements to distribute the proxy statements to
all the beneficial holders. There is a fairly complicated procedure for doing that,
then they follow those instructions. But if an individual does not send back proxy
instructions generally, the institution will not vote those shares at all, see, and that
in effect is a no vote. So it's a problem in the United States to get the shareholders
to vote since the institutions will not vote for them. My question is, ADRs are
generally used in the United States mainly to facilitate investments by more passive
investors like me, so I assume that if a major shareholder from the United States is
investing Mexico in a big way, they're going to insist on direct ownership of the
shares rather than ADRs, correct?
CARRILLO: That's true. ADRs are used basically for initial public offerings
(IPO)5 of Mexican companies. If you are a major investor, you would request other
types of securities that would give you direct voting rights in Mexico.
ROGERS: One final question, then we'll turn it over to the audience. One of
the differences between the U.S. and Mexican contacts is clearly that the breadth of
the capital markets in Mexico is much narrower than in the U.S. One of the reasons
for that is pension funds don't invest in equity markets in Mexico to the extent that
they do in the U.S. So my question is: what are the prospects for opening up some
of the restrictions that currently apply to pension funds investing in equities in
Mexico, and how much potential is there for that step leading to the creation of truly
public corporations in Mexico?
CARRILLO: Right now, pension funds are one of the major institutional
investors of Mexico. The reason is that they're considered institutional not because
they're investing in equity; they're not permitted to invest in equity. But they are
institutional in the sense that there could be long-term shareholders or equity
investors in Mexico due to the amount of assets that they have under management.
The possibility of permitting these pension funds to enter into the equity market is
currently being discussed. First, it would help transparencies. Second, it would help
accountability. Third, it would help make a proper evaluation of the Mexican equity
market. Nevertheless, there is a political issue here and that is since the pension
funds handle the resources of the Mexican unions, in the sense the workers, there is
the policy issue as to what extent we could be confronted with a crisis like we had
in 1994-95', as to the stability of a financial system, but there the stability of the
welfare of social interest in Mexico. But I personally think it would help us in

5. An initial public offering (IPO) is the first sale of stock by a company to the public. lPOs are generally
offered by smaller, newer companies seeking equity capital to expand their business.
6. In December 1994, the Mexican peso lost almost 30 percent of its value against the dollar after the
government abandoned a 7-year-old plan to keep the currency stable. (The Houston Chronicle,Dec. 24, 1994, page

AI.) The devaluation crisis affected almost all of Latin America and burdened many countries with foreign debt.
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valuation and transparency of the Mexican markets if we let people invest in
equities.
MARTINEZ: In that regard you also need to think of the conflict of interest if
that market is open to really invest in the equity by these companies.
ROGERS: Lic. Carrillo, have the latest legislative changes addressed the issue
of conflicts of interest, at least with respect to brokerage firms?
CARRILLO: Yes, it has. At the same time, since the law was enacted the
retirement funds have independent directors and investment committees, and the
investment decisions in the funds are taken by an investment committee composed
by the majority of independent directors. But the board has to approve or confirm
the investment decisions. Therefore, to the extent in Mexico and worldwide, we
have confidence in the fiduciary capability of an independent director.
Nevertheless, as Lic. Martinez says, there could be a potential conflict of interest
issue. At least, there could be a prima facie incidence of conflict of interest if we see
that non-independent directors are making the decisions to invest in equity.
ROGERS: Mr. Jduregui?
MIGUEL JAUREGUI: I would like to elaborate on the panel's comments.
What we're looking for is transparency, security of transactions with securities, and
we're looking for prompt disclosure of any irregularities. The reason we're trying
to do that, and I may be pointing out the obvious, is because the transparency of the
security will be equal to the appetite of the market for that security. Moreover in
your scenario, John Rogers, you were describing to the retirement fund directors

being able to invest, it hinges on the transparency and propriety of the issuer and the
propriety of the governance of the issue and on the actual value, which is what Mr.
Carrillo Gamboa was saying about the real value of the security if you're dealing
with fiduciary funds of savers. I would like to put two points to Mr. Polson and
certainly to Mr. Carrillo, as well as any of the members of the panel. My law firn
is representing the SEC7 in the recent insider trading issues, and we have found a
couple of serious issues. First, we don't have harmonization of procedures between
the U.S. and Mexico in order to take depositions of people in Mexico and in order
to follow an orderly procedure of the SEC investigation in our country. If we are
to trade in public securities of Mexican issuers in the U.S., or to use ADRs, there
needs to be harmonization. It is also necessary to be careful that Mexican
procedures are observed in the U.S. and U.S. procedures are observed in Mexico.
We now see in the registration of Citigroup8 as a public company in Mexico that
we're going to need the reciprocal sort of understanding and harmonization. For
instance, there is a situation that hopefully will improve in Mexico through the
Securities Market Law.' That is, many times, the Mexican Comisi6n Nacional

7. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created by the U.S. Congress to regulate the
securities markets and protect investors. The SEC enforces the Securities Act of 1933. The statutes administered
by the SEC are designed to promote full public disclosure and protect the investing public against fraudulent and
manipulative practices in the securities market.
8. In August 2001, New York-based financial corporation Citigroup purchased Banamex, Mexico's second
largest bank.
9. The Mexican Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores or LMV) regulates the issuance of
a corporation's stock and the voting rights associated with shares of stock. http:lwww.bmv.com.mx/bmv/

leyval.html
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Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV) ° has missed the opportunity to look into insider
trader issues, because the statute of limitations has run or because they didn't see
any purpose in looking at it since there was no criminal or at least civil remedy. My
view is that the more technical you become in the securities market, the less you will
use criminal prosecution and more the civil restitution, which is where I would like
to wind up. So, comments, please?
ROGERS: Mr. Polson?
POLSON: I have a couple of comments on the process, and Mr. Martinez has
some comments on insider trading in particular. The emphasis on the civil side of
securities enforcement in the United States is more institutional than statutory. All
these things are crimes. But the SEC has the authority to bring its own civil lawsuits
for injunctive relief, including disgorgement of illegally obtained profits, in order
for them to prosecute. They can't prosecute a crime themselves; it must be referred
to the Justice Department and/or to individual U.S. Attorneys and, frankly, that is
not a major emphasis of the Justice Department. It hasn't been for years. They are
swamped with drug cases.
MARTINEZ: The situation is that there is an information agreement between
the CNBV and the SEC, and the way we have seen it and we have participated in a
few cases of investigation with the SEC, is, in Mexico, you will have to go through
CNBV if the only thing the SEC wants is information. First, people will have to
appear and go through the SEC procedure on a voluntary basis. Second, we have
seen the SEC going to the U.S. courts and try to subpoena Mexican parties, or it is
also possible, although we have not seen it, for the SEC to come directly to Mexican
courts. The current trend is that the CNBV, if it doesn't want to be put aside, will
have to participate much more and reach a level of cooperation with the SEC. I
don't think that they have any other way around but just to participate with them.
ROGERS: Lic. Carrillo, do you have any comments?
CARRILLO: Well, number one, in the amendment to the Securities Act, it is
provided that now the CNBV has the authority to take depositions in Mexico. That
will be very useful because under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)"
between the SEC and the CNBV, we could act more promptly if we are representing
the prosecutors. If we are representing the insiders, we have a question of
constitutionality of the Mexican CNBV statute; therefore you could have certain
rights of actions for depositions being taken in Mexico. But I fully agree that the
SEC could go through the CNBV, the Mexican State Department, or the Mexican
courts.

ROGERS: So in other words, you see this process potentially being tied up by
amparo proceedings 2 , which would prevent the disclosure?

10. The Comisi6n NacionalBancariay de Valores (CNBV) is the entity that oversees the Mexican securities
market, and in general, Mexico's financial sector.
11. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Comisidn Nacional de Valores of Mexico on Consultation, Technical Assistance, and Mutual Assistance for the

Exchange of Information, International Series Release No. 181 (Oct. 18, 1990).
12. Amparo proceedings are summary proceedings of Mexican courts, which serve to guarantee
constitutional rights.
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CARRILLO: The idea is that the CNBV can act promptly in all investigations
through depositions and through the MOU. That is, the SEC could request the
CNIBV to take depositions in insider trading investigations.
JOHN WALSH 3 : I have two questions related to the enforceability of
agreements among shareholders in joint ventures. First, with respect to arbitration
clauses, is it possible in a shareholders agreement to specify not only that any
disputes will be arbitrated, but they will be arbitrated using some law other than
Mexican law, assuming we're talking about a Mexican corporation. Second, a fairly
common shareholders agreement in international transactions would be one in which
there were multiple shareholders. For example, two shareholders get together and
say before any shareholders' meeting, we're going to meet. We're going to agree among ourselves or make a decision as to a particular issue or all the issues at the
shareholders agreement, and then each of us is bound when we actually get to the
shareholders agreement to vote that way, even if we objected in the pre-meeting
meeting. Would that be enforceable under Article 1981" of the Mexican law?
MARTINEZ: As to your first question, it wouldn't be in the parties' best
interest to submit the agreements or the part of the documents to different laws. If
you are dealing with a Mexican company, you should stick with Mexican law. Also,
as I said, in connection with the corporate information and economic rights of
shareholders under the corporation, you have to stick to Mexican law. But certainly
if you have other agreements under your master contribution or shareholder
agreement, you can submit it to whatever law you wish to, and certainly either to
arbitration or to local courts. As to the second question, which is more difficult in
that regard, the meeting that you are describing among shareholders would be in
violation of Article 198. Certainly, the important element would be to prove it,
either in arbitration or in court. The only way to prove it would be in writing.
Evidence of witnesses, that they met in a certain hotel, or flew together from Mexico
City to the United States and were chatting about it is not very useful. You need
hard evidence in order to prove the point that they agreed and therefore violated
Article 198.
CAPfN: As to your first question, I think in reality you will not be able to make
it under New York law because in that case, it will not be considered a Mexican
company. That is because Mexican companies, by the commercial code, are the
companies which are incorporated in accordance with Mexican law. So if you are
going to be using, say, New York law for purposes of deciding how shareholder
meetings are going to be treated, it will not be considered a Mexican company.
ROGERS: Could you envision a kind of dual governing law provision in the
shareholders agreement under which everything not covered by the bylaws, for
example, would be governed by New York law?
CAPN: Nothing which is covered by the bylaws under Mexican law will be
dealt with under New York law, maybe, but what happened there is that everything
would be covered because Mexican law will also apply, maybe application
supplementary of other Mexican regulations. It would be very difficult to find a
13. John Walsh is an attorney with Hill and Robbins in Denver, Colorado.
14. Mexico's General Law of Corporations (Ley General de Sociedades Mercantilesor LGSM), enacted in
1934, sets forth the basic provisions for incorporation of corporations, shareholders' rights, mangement and
oversight of management, and financial performance. http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/144.
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case in which you will find something that is not there. To the extent that you have
soft information in the trade secrets under the joint venture agreement, I would say
the question is whether you're more protected if you have an injunction from a court
in the United States or if you go through arbitration. It's just a question to my
colleagues.
MICHAEL OWEN'": I have a question for Lic. Carrillo. I'd like to try to flesh
out the definition of independent director. You indicated that there is no definition
of independent director. In the 1980s and certainly right now, during the debt
restructurings, one situation that develops often is that bank creditors are asked to
capitalize part of their debt and receive equity in the company. On numerous
occasions they need, as a part of that, to elect directors that they nominate. Often
those directors do not come from the banks; they are very well known, highly
respected business executives in Mexico. My question is: simply because they are
in effect nominated by a group of shareholders, in this case the bank creditors, do
they lose their status as independent directors or would they still be considered as
independent directors?
CARRILLO: Due to the fact that the directors are nominated by the banks who
are equity holders, there is the risk of that independence being lost. Nevertheless,
I have a case of an issuer in Mexico, a Mexican-listed company, and we're looking
to have a very objective interpretation of the degree of independence. The argument
is that even though I have been nominated by an equity holder, I have an
independent business judgment. So the issue is not resolved, but under the Mexican
Securities Act, it would not qualify as independent. That is a question of

interpretation right now.
ROGERS: Mr. Loera?
ORLANDO LOERA ": One of the comments is that holders of 15 percent of the
shares can bring actions against the board under the changes in the law. What action
can they take, for what type of activity, and where would that action be adjudicated?
CARRILLO: The actions are similar to those for non-listed companies, but
instead of having a 33 percent equity interest, it is lower. In order to bring that
action, first you need a shareholder resolution saying there was a lack of
professionalism by the directors. In other words, you cannot request a direct action
if there is no shareholder resolution that imposes liability. Second, the threshold of
the equity ownership is enabled to bring that action, but you need a decision of the
shareholders that there is liability on the part of the directors.
MARTINEZ: I think that first of all you cannot go directly to court and sue your

director if you don't have a previous stockholders meeting in which you voted
against the actions of those board members. If you have such a vote, then you have

the right to go to court. But you must have the objective measure of civil
responsibility and consider what damage or harm are you doing to your interests or
to your corporation. Again, evidence is an important element. You have to fulfill
the formalities of going through the board decisions, through the stockholders
decisions. Once these have been met, then you go to court.

15. Michael Owen is an attorney with Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &Walker, LLP, inLos Angeles, California.
16. Orlando Loera is an attorney at Bank of America inMexico City.
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ROGERS: If the dissenting shareholder is making the claim, how can it hope to
get a shareholder resolution?
MARTINEZ: Well, you have to wait or you have to request the inspector or the
same board to call a meeting, and if not, you go to court and ask to have a call
published for a stockholders meeting. In that regard, you have certain rights as a
minority shareholder to ask the board for a particular decision of the shareholders'
meeting or to ask the inspector to publish the call.
MR. CAPfN LOPEZ: I think that it goes back to my comment about the
relationship between a corporation and the shareholders. I agree with Lic. Martinez.
Article 16117 clearly states that the responsibility of the administrators will be
required once the general assembly meeting has voted for that. However, also
Article 16318 provides civil responsibility of the administrator against any
shareholders. It then says at least 33 percent of the shareholders can go directly to
the judge and request a judgment of civil responsibility against an administrator for
any wrongdoings that have created a problem for the corporation and indirectly for
them as shareholders.
STEVE KARGMAN' 9 : This is a question for Mr. Carrillo. You had spoken
about the expanded powers of the audit committee, particularly in respect to relatedparty transactions?
LIC. CARRILLO GAMBOA: Yes.
KARGMAN: I have two questions about that. First: is there any dollar or peso
threshold? Second: if a shareholder believes that the board or company has entered
into a transaction that is not at arm's length, can they bring a direct action in court
or should they still go through this shareholders' meeting?
LIC. CARRILLO GAMBOA: First, the scope of the auditing committee's
authority is something that has to be included in the bylaws. The law provides that
they have to review related-party transactions, but the other activities have to be in
the bylaws. In my experience, we normally endow the auditing committee with the
responsibility of reviewing not only related-party transactions, but also management
compensation, the level of disclosure of financial statements, and how they are
prepared. Second, it would be possible at least to try to bring an action in court
based on the fact that the auditing committee, after certain findings, concluded that
under certain related-party transactions there was possible liability. This is because
the auditing committee is a delegated authority of the board in certain cases. The
auditing committee would request a professional opinion of fairness in connection
with their conduct from a major accounting firm in Mexico. Third, with that the
auditing committee would have to respond to a shareholders' meeting and at least
give an assessment as to whether the director has a duty. In pursuing this action,
you have the risk that a Mexican judge could say, "First we have to hear how the
shareholders have discussed the matter in a meeting before we accept this type of
action." But if we try to have it as a pejorative action, maybe it's something that
could work. It's just a personal thought.

17. General Law of Corporations, supra note 14 above.
18.

Id.

19. Steve Kargman is an attorney at the Export-Import Bank in Washington, D.C.
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DOUG DOETSCH°: I have two questions. First, on the derivative actions that
have been discussed which a 15 percent shareholder may bring, I want to make sure
I understand the sequence of events. Say there were a 15 percent shareholder who
had a concern about a related-party transaction or some action that had been taken
that was against the estatutos or some other independent director issue, for example,
duty of care, duty of candor, anything that is perhaps not explicitly laid out in the
estatutos. Would that 15 percent shareholder have to go to a shareholders' meeting
that they've called?
CARRILLO: That's correct.
DOETSCH: So they would go to the shareholders' meeting, they would raise
the question at the shareholders' meeting. Assuming that they're a minority
shareholder, a 15 percent shareholder, the majority shareholders are quite satisfied
with what's happened and are likely not to take any action. But the fact that a
15 percent shareholder has raised it as an initial matter at the shareholders' meeting,
even if it is voted down or ignored, then they have the procedural right to petition
for a derivative action? Do I understand the sequence correctly?
CARRILLO: No. You have to have the affirmative vote of the shareholders or
you have to be a dissenting shareholder. Let's assume that the shareholders'
meeting passes a vote and says that there's no liability. That's the end of the story.
MARTINEZ: In my opinion, it would be a two-tier process. First, you voted
against it, so you have the right to oppose the resolution of the stock holders and file
it in court before bringing your action against the directors. Except if the majority
are engaged in bluntly illegal or criminal acts, then any minority shareholder can do
it. If not, you will have to resort to a second-tier decision to fight the resolution of
the majority shareholders, and the majority shareholders will have to prove that
those actions were taken legally or not in violation of the general rules.
DOETSCH: So, to follow up, if the majority agrees with your contention that
an action against the best interests of the company has taken place, then you can
start a derivative action. Is that right?
CARRILLO: Yes. Right now, since you have auditing committees, the other
question would be whether the opinion of the auditing committee could be not final
but relevant in the shareholders' meeting. At that shareholders' meeting, you could
also have the situation of conflict of interest of the represented shareholders. The
report of the auditing committee could be very important in that case. Finally, if the
auditing committee has sufficient evidence, a criminal case for mismanagement of
assets is possible. That is a felony in Mexico. That could cover directors, officers,
and any other person who has the custody of assets in Mexico. It is not a federal
crime; it's a crime under Mexican state law. It's very efficient. Criminal charges
on mismanagement of assets impose liability on management and directors.
DOETSCH: The second question that I had was to follow up on Mr. Owen's
question about independent directors. He asked about directors appointed by banks
that are major shareholders as a result of a debt restructuring. I think the answer was
that it's not clear in the law, but your presumption was these independent
individuals that would be nominated by the creditor shareholders would not be
independent. My question is, if that is the correct interpretation, wouldn't that

20. Doug Doetsch is an attorney at Mayer, Brown & Platt in Chicago, Illinois.
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likewise disqualify independent business people that are nominated? I assume these
people are nominated every day by the majority shareholders precisely to be the
independent directors that the company requires. That's because, both in the United
States and, I presume, in Mexico, so-called independent directors are usually people
that are nominated by the majority shareholders or majority blocks on the board who
are known to be management-friendly. You don't voluntarily nominate to the board
someone who's going to be unfriendly to you.
MARTINEZ: That is correct, and certainly there is no doubt we have a long way
to go in that regard, even through court resolutions. The key test right now would
be not only the nomination but the economic independence. There is a rule that if
you are an independent member of the board, your income from that company or
from that group of shareholders should not exceed 10 percent of your income. At
least, that objective measure will start to bite whether you are independent or not.
Certainly there will be cases that go to court and the court will decide whether you
are independent or not.
LIC. CAPIN LOPEZ: A very good thing is that lawyers are considered
independent, right?
MARTINEZ: Provided you pass the economic test as well, because that's also
important.
ROGERS: So does that mean that a lawyer who is counsel for one of the
majority shareholders would be treated as a related party and therefore not
independent?
MARTINEZ: Yes, such a lawyer could be treated as a related party. If he's
receiving more than 10 percent of his annual income in that regard, then he will not
pass the economic test and will not be considered independent.
DON HERNANDEZ": It's not a question, it's really a clarification. Even
though the law doesn't define what independent directors are, Circular 113322 of the
CNBV, which incorporates the Code of Government Practices, defines what
disqualifies a director as independent. Therefore, as long as you're not within the
disqualification list under Circular 1133, anyone else would be independent. That
ought to clarify things.
ROGERS: Is that circular still in force?
CARRILLO: Yes, and let me just make this clarification. The case we're
handling right now has to do with the representation of a director appointed by a
bank as independent. The auditing committee's argument is that the director does
not have any direct business affairs with the corporation, and that the bank that
nominated this director does not have any further lending activities with the
corporation. We're reviewing this in an auditing committee in which we are
members. I'm a member of that auditing committee. It's a very important topic
right now in Mexico.
POLSON: I just want to observe that in the United States, lender liability
theories would make most banks very hesitant to ever appoint a director to a
corporation that they've lent money to.
21. Abdon Hernandez, is an attorney with Servicios tndustriales Penoles, S.A. de C.V., in Mexico City.
22. Circular 1133 of the CNBV dictates certain reporting requirements, including submission to the CNBV
of economic, accounting and legal information. Economic and accounting information must be filed on an annual
or quarterly basis.
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JOSE LERMA 23 : This question is for Lic. Martinez and the rest of the
gentlemen as well. Lic. Martinez, you made a comment with respect to the
reemergence of the sociedad de responsibilidad limitada24 as opposed to the
sociedad an6nima25, and also to the relatively recent preference for joint ventures
in terms of business transactions in Mexico. You also pointed out several
advantages because of changing conditions. One of them was open markets. Would
you be able to amplify on this statement in terms of American or foreign investment
in Mexico?
MARTINEZ: Yes. The experience was that basically for foreign reasons, not
for Mexican reasons, the foreign investor preferred to use the sociedad de
responsibilidad limitada, or limited liability company, which has a different structure
in Mexico than the sociedad an6nima. In that regard we saw a lot of joint ventures
going that way, particularly hotel businesses or agricultural and cattle raising
businesses. These joint ventures had incorporated the foreign element into their
ownership, even what we call agricultural land for raising cattle or other agricultural
purposes. Then, of course, there was industrial processing. In that regard, the tax
advantage probably will disappear. These types of companies still enjoy a
preferential tax treatment than the general tax treatment than all corporations have.
ROGERS: One point about the SRL, or the limited liability company, that we
might want to touch upon is it's my understanding that an SRL cannot have its
partes sociales26 listed on the Securities Exchange. One issue that comes up in a
private equity context is: do you want to make a private equity shareholder
agreement with respect to an SRL if the ultimate objective or one of the possible
objectives for some of the shareholders is to have the company go public?
CARRILLO: Yes. Under Mexican law, that type of closely-held corporation
cannot be listed in the stock exchange because there is a provision under Mexican
corporate law. So if we're making a joint venture and we want to have registration
rights for secondary listing in Mexico in liquidity, I think we have to follow the
sociedadan6nima de capital variable 7.
ROGERS: One point of clarification. When we talk about a joint venture,
confusion can arise because U.S. lawyers tend to refer to joint venture in a very
broad sense as including any kind of entity or arrangement under which there are
two or more major investors. On the other hand, under Mexican law, joint venture
is sometimes used to refer to the asociaci6n en participaci6n, which is not a legal
entity. Could someone describe that?
MARTINEZ: Right. The asociaci6n en participaci6n is a contract regulated
under the corporate business law of Mexico. Basically it doesn't create a different
entity. It just indicates the will of the parties. Under Mexican law there is no legal

23. Jose Lerma is an attorney at Lerma & Associates in Tucson, Arizona.
24. A sociedad de responsibilidadlimitada is a Mexican limited liability company.
25. A sociedad anonima is a Mexican privately held corporation.
26. Parte socialcan be translated as "partnership interest," or what the partner of a general partnership or
limited partnership owns.
27. A sociedad anonima de capital variable is a corporation that entails limited responsibility on the part

of shareholders and indefinite corporate life, as its capital can be increased or diminished by a simple resolution by
the board of directors, if allowed under the corporation's statutes. CanadExport Online, May 22, 1998,
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.calenglish/news/newsletr/canex/980522ee.htm.
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definition of this kind of joint venture but certainly what we have discussed on this
panel.
ROGERS: Any other questions?
MARCO HERNANDEZ28 : At least from the standpoint of the responsibility of
the auditing committee or the compliance officer, these two entities usually depend
on the board of directors, don't they? They report to the board of directors.
CARRILLO: They report to the board. Nevertheless, under the amendment to
the Securities Act, their report has to go to the shareholders.
HIERNANDEZ: If there are certain independent directors, then if they report
something that needs to be vetoed, the spirit of the law would make it very clear that
the flow would come from the controller, the compliance officer, or the auditing
committee, to the board of directors. That is the whole purpose of the independent
board of directors, to make evident to the shareholders something that needs to be
vetoed.
CARRILLO: That's correct. Let me just give you one example. The Mexican
FDIC2 9 investments right now are subject to high scrutiny. Therefore, in the bylaws
of the Mexican investments that are made by the FDIC, we have a provision for all
the companies in which they invest that says that if the auditing committee of the
corporation, by unanimous vote of those person who do not have a conflict, then the
auditing committee through the bylaws has the right to request the inspector to call
a shareholders' meeting and the auditing committee through the inspector will
request the removal of the director.
ROGERS: I wonder if someone could comment on the role of the comisario and
in the traditional sense, and to what extent have the comisarios fulfilled or not
fulfilled the functions that were given to them under corporate law?
CAPAIN: The comisario, or the examiner in English, is the person who represents
the shareholders in order to review, approve, and validate the actions and accounts
prepared by the board. He responds directly to the shareholders and he is their
representative. I would not say he does this in the day-to-day management of the
company; it could be invoked if nobody wanted to have a comisario sitting there,
overseeing the day-to-day management. But the obligation established in the law
is that he has to review the annual accounts and report, and then approve them-or,
if not approve them, he gives his comments and his point of view for approval by
the shareholders.
ROGERS: When there are conflicts between a minority shareholder and the
majority, under what conditions does the minority shareholder have the right to
appoint its own comisario?
CAPIN: In the privately held corporation that's over 25 percent and in a publicly
held corporation, it's 10 percent. It's the same rules as for appointment of board
members, as I remember.
ROGERS: Twenty-five for privately held and 10 percent for public. Question
in the back?

28. Marco Hernandez Tracey is an attorney at Strasburger & Price, S.C., Mexico City.
29. The Mexican Central Bank Instituto Para la Proteccion al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB) is the Mexican
equivalent of the FDIC. IPAB is a decentralized organism of the Mexican Federal Public Administration, created
under the Law for the Protection of Bank Savings. http://www.ipab.org.mx/Englishabout.html.
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MICHAEL GORDON: With regard to independent, or as we often call them,
outside directors, there were some comments made about U.S. compensation
committees and how they are often made up of outside directors. I don't think the
intention was to suggest that these committees have had a significant impact on
moderating the acceleration of executive salaries. Two things belie that. One is that
the figures we see in Business Week, Wall Street Journal,and other publications
suggest that the difference between lower management salaries and upper
management salaries has accelerated over the last decade. Secondly, those outside
directors are so often the executives of another corporation. If they were to try to
moderate the salaries of those whom they're voting on, they ought to be careful
because they may be suggesting that their own salaries back home are too high. Let
me just ask another question that deals with a different matter. Several Mexicans
form a small company. There's no shareholder agreement. They include in the
bylaws a provision suggesting that all corporate matters should be determined by
Mexican courts under Mexican law. After a while, one of those parties decides to
move abroad. They enter into a shareholders agreement because that person is going
to have a different kind of participation but still would like to redhain a shareholder
and receive some income. No provision in that agreement has anything to do with
what courts may assert jurisdiction. The party abroad finds that the other two are
skimming profits and violating several provisions that deal with both responsibility
of corporate directors and with shareholder agreement rights. This case is filed in
a jurisdiction outside of Mexico, where the Mexican parties have personal assets.
The defense is that this matter should be governed under Mexican law and heard in
Mexican courts. What should the American court do? Apply Mexican law? Move
the matter to the Mexican court? Would a Mexican court respect an American
judgment that was rendered against the Mexican defendants?
POLSON: First of all, you're right about the compensation of executives having
increased, not decreased. The amount of information available on what that
compensation is and how it compares has had some effect on the price of
companies. In fact, I was involved in a hostile takeover this spring in which
management was thrown out because shareholders were so incensed by their
compensation arrangements.
So the directors may not be modifying the
compensation of management, but sometimes the shareholders are doing so, either
indirectly or directly. As to your hypothetical, first of all, there wouldn't have been
a violation of U.S. federal securities laws because there was no sale of securities in
the United States. Second, since presumably the affairs of the corporation are being
managed and continue to be managed, and here I'm presuming the affairs of the
corporation are mainly Mexican. While I'm not a conflicts-of-law expert, I think
a United States court would have to refrain from making any decision based on
United States law. I expect the U.S. court would probably not hear the case at all
until some decision had been rendered in Mexico that could possibly be enforced in
the United States.
GORDON: Would the answer be different if, under the shareholder agreement
and as in this example, the parties submitted to New York law and jurisdiction?

30. Michael Gordon is the Chesterfield Smith Professor of law at the University of Florida in Gainesville,
Florida.
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POLSON: Well, I think that there would have to be some sort of nexus with the
United States operations before an American court would hear the case. But I don't
think just choosing the law of the United States is enough to give an American court
jurisdiction.
ROGERS: And even if it did and rendered a judgment, say, for injunctive relief,
would a judgment for injunctive relief be honored by the Mexican courts?
MARTINEZ: It would be difficult if the other Mexican shareholders fight the
venue of the foreign courts. What Mr. Polson is saying is perfectly right. If you had
not only the choice, but also the relationship or some business transaction, the U.S.
court will take jurisdiction and probably, if accepted by the parties, then the
judgment would be enforceable in Mexico.
ROGERS: Another question?
KRUMBEIN3": This question should bring you back to the basic premise, the
difference between having something in the bylaws, estatutos, versus having it in the
shareholder agreement. The action on the shareholder agreement is strictly a private
contract action between the parties. In essence, a corporation or third parties are not
bound by the contract. That's the reason why you want to put those clauses in the
bylaws as opposed to a shareholder agreement.
MARTINEZ: By all means. You want them to be in the bylaws for sure, and
you can have them in your agreement. Now, what I understood is basically they are
not committing corporate breaches in that regard, but violating economic rights.
That's where you have possibly try other alternatives despite what you already
agreed, but with certain conditions, like the venue, that there's not only the choice
but that you are doing business in a certain part of the United States.
ROGERS: While we haven't used the "C" word, convergence, in fact we're
seeing a good deal of convergence in this area. Mexican law is in some respects
getting closer to U.S. law, at least concerning publicly traded companies. With
respect to privately traded companies, there hasn't been as much convergence as of
yet, but we may see more of that in the future, given that there is a general
recognition that the corporate law in the Mexico, being a 1934 statute, may need
some modernization in the coming years.
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